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Musical Practice and Social Structure: A Toolkit

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The sociology of music has a strong empirical tradition, yet retains inspiration from its more philosophically oriented past. For sociologists, especially in recent years as the field has experienced a cultural and interpretive turn, the study of music has been linked to wider questions concerning social structure, stability and change, the interaction between social networks and musical production, the emotions, the body, the study of social movements, identity politics, and organizational ecology. In all these areas, sociologists of music have sought to ground their enquiries through the use of empirical methods designed for the scrutiny of behavioral trends, organizations, and forms of action. In this chapter I take stock of the sociology of music's "toolkit" and present some of the best-known empirical work within the field. My discussion is organized around two broad areas of study: musical production and musical consumption. To contextualize these topics, and to differentiate the empirical sociology of music from musicology's growing interest in social constructionism, I begin with a brief sketch of classic, and more overtly theoretical, work in music sociology.

Sociology of Music: The Classic Legacy

The most sociologically ambitious theoretical perspective to be developed during the last century is to be found in the work of T. W. Adorno (1903–1969). Adorno's perspective is distinguished by its comprehensive vision, and for the central place it accords to music within modern (and, as Adorno perceived, often repressive) culture and social formation.

In contrast to Max Weber's more formal concern with the origins of musical-technical practices specific to the West (Weber 1958), Adorno focused on the question of music's ideological dimension. In line with classical philosophers such as Plato and Aristotle, he pursued the question of music's ability not only to reflect but also to instigate or reinforce forms of consciousness and social structures. For Adorno, different forms of music were homologous with (structurally parallel to, and thus able to inculcate) cognitive habits, modes of consciousness, and historical developments. As he saw it, music's compositional processes—its degree of conventionality, the interrelation of musical parts or voices, the arrangement of consonance and dissonance—could serve as means of socialization. This ultimately structuralist notion

is perhaps best exemplified by considering Adorno's views on the contradictory possibilities for consciousness posed by twentieth-century musical forms. On the one hand, he believed that Schoenberg's music could enable critical consciousness because, through its processes of composition—for example, its use of dissonance and formal fragmentation—it modeled a mode of critical attention to the world that refused to offer "false" musical comfort. On the other hand, jazz, Tin Pan Alley, and other popular genres inculcated psychological regression and infantile dependency (Adorno 1990; Wilkin 1998), providing, in the age of "Total Administration," a medium that "trains the unconscious for conditioned reflexes" (Adorno 1976:53). "Wrong" music thus had to be denounced, and for this reason, Adorno considered socio-musical study to possess a special urgency: given music's capacity to "aid enlightenment" (Adorno 1973:15), socio-musical analysis was nothing less than a tool for liberation.

These are certainly profound questions and ones to which musicologists are increasingly drawn. During the 1970s, interest in Adorno's work was located peripherally within musicology (e.g., Subotnik 1976, 1978, 1983; see also Subotnik 1990 and McClary 1991:175n). During the 1980s and 1990s, by contrast, musicologists increasingly turned to Adorno. While they generally rejected his dismissal of popular culture and his notion that truly great, liberatory music was that which had "escaped from its social tutelage and is aesthetically fully autonomous" (Adorno 1976:209), they took up Adorno's concern for music's social and ethical character. In particular, they sought to "ground" musical works, and the values embodied in them, either through showing how musical representations inscribed social relations (Subotnik 1983; Leppert and McClary 1987), or through relating them to a cultural history or psychology of music consumption (Cook 1990, Frith 1996, Johnson 1995). Consideration of how musicologists responded to Adorno, and more broadly of the way in which they adopted a social-critical perspective, helps to illuminate some of the differences between musicology's and sociology's "toolkits." It also provides a springboard into contemporary sociology's more "action-oriented" focus on music as social practice, its shift away from a homology-centered, structuralist paradigm, and its quite different take on the "social construction" of music.

Ten years on from Goehr (1992) and Randel (1992), a form of social constructionism thrives in musicology, one that opposes itself to traditional understandings of what is "natural" in music. Even basic, previously taken-for-granted concepts such as the musical "work" have been deconstructed, shown to be purely social constructions of restricted historical and geographical application. Today, most musicologists would probably agree with Randel's apt observation that musicology's traditional "toolbox" was designed for the construction and maintenance of a canon of acceptable topics, namely, works and composers. But, as I shall suggest in this chapter, the forms of constructionism now prevalent within musicology are, from a current sociological perspective, not so different from the structuralism characteristic of Adorno's work. Although there are some notable exceptions, particularly studies of musical listening, reception and use, constructionist approaches in musicology still center on works, and on critical readings of them that aim to reveal the music's social content.

In the writings of Lawrence Kramer and Susan McClary, for example, we are di-

rected to see music as structurally similar (homologically linked) to social phenomena, or as a "representation" of some extramusical phenomenon. The methodological toolkit here—uncovering intertextual allusion, identifying conventional tropes and the ideological connotations and functions of these tropes, comparing (some aspect of) music's structure with (some aspect of) the structure of something else—maintains a separation between works and the actual contexts of their production and reception. While social contexts and contents are the ultimate quarry of this type of "New" musicology (as the work of such writers as Kramer and McClary was termed in the 1990s), they are typically pursued through the analysis of texts, rather than through more ecological, empirically oriented investigations of the production, distribution, and consumption of music. Such a move also sidesteps the contested meanings that arise within particular contexts, for example, through resistance to particular musicological interpretations. In short, it is impossible to specify music's mechanism of operation: there is no methodology for describing music as it acts within actual social settings, specific spaces, and in real time.

I do not here wish to imply that sociology cannot benefit from or be compatible with this type of text-based musicological constructionism; on the contrary, a weakness of sociology has been its failure to deal with music's specifically musical materials, and here textual interpretation and analysis can help to draw sociological studies on to more firmly musical terrain. Nor do I wish to imply any clear division of labor between musicology and sociology; some of the best "sociological" work on musical topics is currently being done by musicologically trained scholars (e.g., Pasler forthcoming). Rather, I wish to contrast the textual focus of "New" musicology with the emphasis of the sociology of music, particularly since the late 1970s, on an action-based paradigm—one that is concerned with the matrices and milieus in which action is framed and effected. Howard Becker (1989: 282) put his finger on the difference when he wrote, with disarming clarity, that sociologists of his persuasion (generally termed "social interactionists") "aren't much interested in 'decoding' artworks [but rather] prefer to see these works as the result of what a lot of people have done jointly." This version of constructionism treats music as a social process, focusing on how musical structures, interpretations, and evaluations are created, revised, and undercut with reference to the social relations and contexts of this activity. It is also concerned with how music provides constraining and enabling resources for social agents—for the people who perform, listen, compose, or otherwise engage with it. As the sociologist Pete Martin (1995: 42) has observed, "in general this turn to the social" in musicological studies has not led to a sustained engagement with the themes and traditions represented within the established discourse of sociology—themes and traditions that are at some remove from Adorno and his structuralist perspective. Martin calls instead for a focus on music as it is lived and experienced, quoting the Swedish musicologist/ethnomusicologist, Olle Edström, on how the members of his group at Gothenburg responded to Adorno: "we gradually gained a deeper insight into the pointlessness of instituting theoretical discourses on music without a solid ethnomusicological knowledge of the everyday usage, function and meaning of music" (Edström 1997: 19, quoted in Martin 2000: 42).

Edström and Martin both allude here to a shift in focus from abstract theory and "macro" issues (such as systems, societal structures, and norms) to grounded theory

and "micro" concerns (such as a focus on individual and collective practice). Part of this shift centers upon the concept of social agency, on how both social and musical forms (including meanings) are put together or accomplished jointly, in Becker's sense. This focus on activity is, as I shall argue intermittently throughout this chapter, a very useful perspective. It is dedicated to elucidating the links between social and musical structures in ways that are more than hypothetical. It conceives of the music-society nexus in terms of the pragmatic contexts within which musical works take shape and come to have "effects" in real situations. This focus on action provides an alternative to homological models and their text-centered methodological toolkit—to the emphasis, *pace* Adorno, Attali (1985), and Shepherd (1991), on how music "reflects," "anticipates," or is structurally analogous to social developments or social structures. From a social-interactionist perspective, then, neither Adorno-inspired sociology of music nor musicology's version of constructionism is sufficient for illuminating ("grounding") music's sociality. The problem with both these inherently structuralist, text-centered modes of study is simply this: they are oriented to the recognition of patterns and structural affinities between two or more realms (music and some aspect of society—ideology, gender or class relations, identities, cognitive styles) but they are not able to document the mechanisms that create these patterns, that is, to describe how music informs or enters social life, and vice versa. They assert links between music and society, but their methodological toolkits do not equip them to show these links in terms of how they are established and how they function within actual musical and social contexts.

By contrast, newer sociological perspectives concerned with social agency investigate the social processes through which these links are forged. As the French sociologist Antoine Hennion says, "It must be strictly forbidden to create links when this is not done by an identifiable intermediary" (1995:248). By this, Hennion means that while music may be, or may seem to be, interlinked to "social" matters, for example, patterns of cognition, styles of action, ideologies, institutional arrangements, such links should not be assumed. Rather, they need to be specified (observed and described) at their levels of operation, for instance in terms of how they are established and come to act. We need, in short, to follow actors in and across situations as they draw music into (and draw on music as) social practice. And this is where empirical methods come into their own within the sociology of music. There are good parallels and precedents to be found in the social study of another "technical" realm: science and technology, in particular in the study of science-in-the-making (Knorr-Cetina 1981; Latour and Woolgar 1986; Bijker, Hughes, and Pinch 1987; Latour 1987). It should be underlined here that these studies of scientific practice and knowledge formation, most of which have been conducted by sociologists with advanced training in the sciences, have concentrated on action—on the situated production of scientific matters of fact, step by (sometimes contested) step. In this respect, such action-based studies move well beyond more general concerns with the parallels between science and society. And some recent studies of this sort have begun to focus explicitly on music technology and musical culture (e.g., Pinch and Trocco 2002).

It is, then, in the focus on culture-producing worlds that the sociology of music has found its empirical feet, and thus a way to ground its claims about the links be-

tween music and society. More specifically, as I will describe below, such work centers on action: on musical practices in and across musical and extramusical realms. For example, it is concerned with musically engaged actors as they constitute (and negotiate the constitution of) music through performance, through coordination, and through reception. It is also concerned with how these constitutive processes in turn draw upon music to constitute other social realities, realities that may exceed the musical but that may, simultaneously, be articulated with reference to music. And with this focus it is possible to dispense with the music-society dichotomy, and to think instead of musical practice as, inevitably, social practice.

Sociology of Music: Musical Production and Its Milieux

During the 1970s and 80s, and particularly in the U.S. and U.K., new paradigms were developed that sought to explore music's links to social processes and contexts rather than structures. Here, music was conceptualized, simply, as social activity. Known as the "production of culture" approach, and developed by scholars such as Peterson (1976), Wolff (1981), Becker (1982) and Zolberg (1990), this perspective provided an effective antidote to the overly theoretical character of Adorno-influenced models. It reinvigorated the sociology of music in its emphasis on action and action's matrices. It reconceptualized the composer, or music producer, as a member of a musical world or community, and as working with and abiding by (or reacting against) conventions and work practices in order to make music. This view was deliberately prosaic; the production of culture approach sought to demystify the romantic notion of "the composer" and its attendant ideology of the genius in the garret.

Karen Cerulo's (1984) study of change in musical composition across six countries during the Second World War serves to illustrate these points. Cerulo focused on the social disturbance brought about by war and its relation to music-compositional practice. She examined the prewar and wartime activities of composers whom she divided into two groups, those located in combat zones and those who operated in more stable environments. She began with the hypothesis that the work of composers located in areas most characterized by social upheaval due to war would exhibit most evidence of stylistic change, with composers based in non-combat zones showing less evidence of change in their compositional styles and practice. She established a sample of wartime works, focusing on pieces that were intended by their composers explicitly as reactions to the war, and compared these with prewar works by the same composers so as to identify any changes in style during the war years. Government-sponsored works were excluded, on the grounds that they may have needed to portray official sentiments (through uplifting march rhythms and so on).

Thus delimited, Cerulo's sample consisted of 16 works by 14 composers over six countries—combat zone (wartime England, France, Hungary, Germany, and Russia) and noncombat zone (prewar England and the U.S.). These works were examined in terms of the following features, conceived of as dependent variables (see this volume, p. 219, for a definition of dependent variables): melodic structure, tonality, dynamics, rhythm, medium of expression and form. ("For purposes of pedagogical vividness and ease of exposition," however, Cerulo's discussion of her find-

ings focused primarily on melody.) In particular, Cerullo sought to measure the degree to which melodies were conjunct ("smooth gradations") or disjunct ("leaping motion") before and after the onset of war in each zone. She plotted melodic pitches using crochets—one for each new pitch—so as to achieve a graph of melodic spacing for each work. She concluded that while before the onset of war the works of all composers in the sample—combat zone and non-combat zone composers, exhibited jagged melodies, after the beginning of the war those in combat zones became conjunct and lengthy, while those in noncombat zones remained unchanged (1984: 892). From this, Cerullo concluded that she had found evidence for the impact of disruption on compositional practice. She then turned to the critical question: how was one to explain this apparent shift in compositional practice?

While older sociological paradigms might have pointed to a homology (or reverse homology) between disruption in society and conjunction in music, with perhaps an associated psychological explanation of trauma and its impact on composers' needs for consonance and congruence of musical material, Cerullo took a different and more pragmatic tack. She emphasized instead how war-zone composers were cut off from normal music-world interactions, from information and communication with fellow composers, and from access to music publications: "The loss of contact with peers experienced by Combat Zone composers destroyed their professional community." This, in turn, Cerullo suggested, "led to the unraveling of the normative prescriptions that govern techniques of composition. Consequently, in the absence of both a supportive system and its enforcement by contemporaries of normative adherence, composers deviate from their current paradigm of musical construction" (184: 900).

To be sure, these conclusions may provide a source for fruitful debate by music historians: why, for example, if changes in stylistic practice were a function of loss of normal networks and communication patterns, should the deviation of isolated war-zone composers all exhibit the same basic tendency—the shift from disjunct to conjunct melodic lines? How might the study benefit from more detailed consideration of the individual work-lives of composers? Does the graphical method of plotting melodic movement provide a valid means for comparing different melodic structures? Could identification and measurement of the parameters of compositional material be combined with an ethnographic understanding of the meanings (local, regional, biographical) associated with musical materials and practices? I suggest that the value of Cerullo's work (and the justification for reading it today) lies in her general interrogative strategy, her bold attempt to specify measurement techniques for the study of compositional practice and, in particular, her focus on production networks and communication as a determinant of this practice.

Cerullo's study is important in the present context not only because it was one of the first sociological works to deal with musical forms and stylistic change, but also because it can be regarded as a pivot between the older homological model and the newer approach, with its emphasis on music-producing worlds and on the social contexts of artistic production. As Cerullo (1984: 885) put it: "the limited body of literature dealing with the transaction of artistic creation and social structure consists almost entirely of large-scale, speculative theories which are heavily influenced by sociohistorical arguments, and whose illustrative support often rests on the sty-

listic and structural changes in the music of a single composer, or a particular musical tradition." While seeking to distance herself from "speculative theory," Cerullo also set her sights on matters that connected back to the grand tradition within music sociology—concerns that were addressed by the earlier homological perspectives she sought to transcend. On the one hand, her work can be read as in contrast to structuralist approaches, such as Lomax's (1968) "cantometric" investigation of correspondences between song styles and societal structures. (For Lomax, song styles reflect societal forms and, thus, thus habits of mind congruent with these forms—see this volume, p. 17, for further details.) On the other hand, Cerullo wished to retain Lomax's concern with musical style and its variation across social space—too often, she argued, ignored by the new perspectives and their focus on production, markets and patronage—while linking that concern with a focus on the production circumstances of composers. In this sense Cerullo's study represented a pioneering attempt to illuminate the "transaction," as she put it, of structure and creation: that is, to devise means of measuring the impact of a changed social context on creative activity in music.

By 1989, the "production" perspective was firmly established in not only the anglophone but also the francophone world, after Pierre Bourdieu's (1984) work on taste publics and social classification systems, and Bruno Latour's studies of science worlds and science in the making (1987). These perspectives and the various publications that issued from them drew upon detailed empirical study—ethnographies, cultural and social histories, quantitative surveys, and studies of institutions. It was precisely what Becker referred to as "what a lot of people have done jointly" that formed the focus of sociological investigation between, roughly, 1978 and the middle 1990s. In retrospect, the contributions of these years may be set in one of three broad categories: (1) conditions of production (2) the construction of musical value and reputation, and (3) musical tastes, consumption, and social identity.

Conditions of Musical Production

Cerullo's work is representative of a large number of studies aiming to show how the content of musical works is shaped in relation to musicians' working conditions. Elias's (1993) pioneering consideration of Mozart, for example, suggests that Mozart's compositional scope was hampered by his location between two patronage modes and his inability to escape the shackles of aristocratic control. Similarly, Becker's (1963) study of dance musicians documents how career patterns and occupational opportunities are shaped by patrons and by the need to find a fit between musicians' aspirations and tastes and what their publics will tolerate. Not only are individual compositional practices affected by productional organization, but so too is the selection of compositions that are ultimately produced and marketed. Peterson and Berger (1990 [1975]) illustrated this point in a highly influential study that revealed how musical innovation was enabled and constrained by infrastructural features of the pop music industry; their work suggested that innovation in pop arises from competition between large record companies and their smaller rivals, showing that diversity in musical forms (as they are produced and reach their publics) is inversely

related to market concentration. At the time their article was published, Peterson and Berger were trailblazers for the "production of culture" perspective, and their study still serves as a model of how to conduct work in this tradition.

Peterson and Berger examined number one hit songs over 26 years of record production, from 1948 to 1973, dividing this period into five eras of greater and lesser degrees of market concentration. Eras of high market concentration were those in which a high proportion of the annual production of hits was produced by one of the four leading companies: during such eras, these companies controlled over 75 percent of the total record market (in fact just eight companies produced nearly all the hit singles). Peterson and Berger considered whether such concentration bred homogeneity of product, pursuing this question by examining the sheer number of records and performers who recorded the hits during their five eras; the thinking was that there might be little incentive to introduce "new" products under conditions of market concentration. They also examined the lyrical content of hits, tracing these variables through the five eras as competition between record companies grew and then diminished over the 26-year period. Simultaneously, they considered indicators of what they termed "unsated demand," such as changes in record sales and the proliferation of music disseminated through live performance and backed up by independent record producers—genres such as jazz, rhythm and blues, country and western, gospel, trade union songs, and the urban folk revival. They then considered the conditions under which the independent producers were able to establish more secure market positions as the top four producers lost control of merchandising their products over the radio. Finally they traced how the record industry and its degree of market concentration expanded and contracted cyclically over time.

By studying conditions of record production and marketing, relating these conditions to new developments in the communications industry, and examining trends in record output and product diversity, Peterson and Berger concluded that changes in concentration lead rather than follow changes in diversity, and that this finding "contradicts the conventional idea that in a market consumers necessarily get what they want" (p. 156). Their study not only highlighted the impact of production-organization on musical trends and styles; it also outlined how popular music production is characterized by cycles, and detailed some of the mechanisms that affect cyclic development.

Peterson and Berger's study set the scene from the 1970s onward for the concern, in popular music studies, with the production system. Negus (1992), for example, has suggested that working practices within the popular music industry are linked to an artistic ideology associated with college-educated white males who came of age in the "rock generation" of the 1960s and 70s. This occupational stratification has consequences for the types of pop that are produced: women and unfamiliar styles and artists, for example, are marginalized (Steward and Garratt 1984). Such forms of gender segregation may also be seen in pedagogical settings (Green 1997), particularly with regard to instrument choice—a topic that overlaps with work by social psychologists (O'Neill 1997).

In the "production" studies discussed so far, the primary methodological strategy consists of a focus on organizational contexts of musical production, and an at-

tempt to conceptualize musical work as not so different from other types of work, insofar as it requires collaboration, resources in the form of materials, conventions, and communication. Through this strategy, music's link to social structure is specified: musical structures are examined in terms of their links to the local contexts or musical worlds in which they are produced, distributed, and consumed. The production perspective thus illuminated the impact of social structure on music in highly concrete ways; it highlighted the mundane circumstances under which musical work gets done, the circumstances under which careers are forged and styles developed and changed. On the heels of the production focus and its attention to creative milieux, came sociological studies of the construction of both musical value and reputation.

The Construction of Musical Value and Reputation

The stratification of composers, styles, and genres is a rich seam of socio-musical research. Historical studies have helped to unveil the strategies by which the musical canon and its hierarchy of "Master [sic] Works" was constructed and institutionalized during the nineteenth century in Europe (Weber 1978; 1991; Citron 1993) and America (DiMaggio 1982). Both an aesthetic movement and an ideology for the furtherance of music as a profession, the fascination with "high" music culture during the nineteenth century was simultaneously a vehicle for the construction of class and status group distinction. It was also a device of music marketing and occupational advancement.

More recent work in this area has gone beyond the distinction between "high" and "low" musical forms. It now includes the issue of how "authenticity" is constructed and contested (Peterson 1997), dismissing the idea of the "work itself" in favor of particular configurations of the work in and through particular performances (Hennion 1997; see also chapter 5, this volume). And it examines the practices and strategies through which particular versions of aesthetic hierarchies are stabilized. For example, Hennion (1989) has drawn comparisons between the recording studio and the scientific laboratory, showing how musical value and scientific fact are both produced through producers' liaisons with various groups such as the public and the media. Similarly, Maisonneuve (2001) has focused on the way in which the twentieth-century technology of the gramophone afforded music's users new and more intensely personal modes of experiencing the love for music. Drawing upon record reviews, catalogues, liner notes, and other documents, Maisonneuve suggests that this technology facilitated a music user actively engaged in constructing her or his tastes and monitoring self-responses. By comparing the two major technological revolutions in music distribution during the century, she shows how both musical listening and the listening subject were technologically transfigured. Her study thus builds upon and gives a new type of spin to William Weber's pioneering work on the emergence of modern musical consumption and notions of "music appreciation." Similarly, it highlights the extent to which the consumption of music involves more than listeners and works, consisting also of networks or, as Maisonneuve puts it, "set-ups" of objects, postures, habits, and evaluative discourses.

Sociological studies of musical value can be regarded as critical or even deconstructive in that they suggest that apparently self-evident judgments of inherent quality are socially constructed. In my own work on Beethoven's reputation, for example (DeNora 1995), I was interested in the interaction between Beethoven's reputation and the organizational culture and practices that allowed Beethoven to be increasingly perceived (and behave) as Vienna's "greatest" composer. This project was by no means posed in contradiction to the idea of musical value (as some musicological critics believed, e.g., Rosen 1996, DeNora and Rosen 1997), but was rather concerned with two main sociological issues. The first was how, to be a social fact, value of any kind needs to be recognized socially. Unlike gravity or the sound barrier, artistic value is an institutional fact, not a natural one; hence, if it is to be valued, music must be socially recognized and institutionalized as valuable, particularly when it is perceived as violating the norms and conventions that characterize a musical field—when in other words, as with Beethoven, its acceptance constitutes a significant reorientation of taste. (The point is not to presume there is anything automatic about these recognition processes, but to explore them to see how they took shape.) The second issue concerned how the musical field was in flux during Beethoven's first decade of operation in Vienna, being increasingly transformed in ways that were conducive to the perception of Beethoven's "greatness": somewhat like a financier, Beethoven gathered increasing means with which to launch increasingly ambitious aesthetic ventures, while simultaneously augmenting his power within the evaluative terrain of that field. In short, I tried to document the fundamentally practical aspects of how one can emerge as a socially recognized "genius," so highlighting the way in which genius, as a social fact, emerges from a particular configuration of evaluative criteria, aesthetic orientation and convention, social acts, discourses, and material culture. The study thus focused on the complex interaction between what Beethoven did, what he could do, and how he was perceived.

Methodologically, the work began with an investigation of three interrelated factors: the organizational context of music patronage as Beethoven entered it in 1792, his social network as it expanded over time, and his social situation as compared to that of some of his competitors. From there, I adapted methods of ethnographic observation for use on historical data, focusing on agents and actions within this musical field—and specifically on the entrepreneurial activities of Beethoven and his patrons as they presented him in contexts that would flatter his talent. Here the data were letters, other accounts, and contemporary descriptions of the ways in which Beethoven was presented to the public and quasi-public worlds of Viennese musical culture. These were, as I have said, highly pragmatic activities accomplished by Beethoven and his supporters, and they included such things as Beethoven's own negotiations with the editor of the *Allgemeine musikalische Zeitung* (a leading music periodical of the day) and his interventions in the world of piano technology. While the study's aims were ultimately sociological rather than musicological—to theorize, via a case study, key issues concerned with the politics of identity—the book also sought to highlight the contingent nature of the writing of history: in relation to music scholarship, this can be understood as a move away from hagiography and toward an ethnomusicological perspective as applied to the canon.

This line of enquiry has been pursued by sociologists in relation to other art

forms—for example, Heinrich's (1996) study of van Gogh's posthumous reputation. It has also been pursued as a collaborative project between a musicologist (J.-M. Fauquet) and a sociologist (Antoine Hennion), in a recent study which argues that the present-day understanding of J. S. Bach is a particular "use" of the composer within a social context (Fauquet and Hennion 2000). By this they mean that the way in which Bach is configured—his value and the ethos for which he is said to stand—represents a form of cultural "work": it is a tool with which social realities are established and elaborated. The nineteenth-century discovery of Bach and his installation as the "father of music," Fauquet and Hennion argue, were also a means of configuring the present; Bach's presence was a resource for articulating the meaning of what it was to be "modern" (Hennion and Fauquet 2001). In this case the empirical strategy was anthropological: Fauquet and Hennion followed various musical (and musicological) actors as they appropriated Bach and so simultaneously produced "Bach" and themselves, defining their own identities in relation to music and, through music, to the social world.

Musical Taste, Consumption and Identity

By definition, sociological studies of musical value and its articulation address the matter of how music is appropriated and how music consumption is linked to status definition. This program is implicit in the work discussed in the previous section, and is in turn buttressed by quantitative studies of arts consumption that document links between musical taste and socioeconomic position.

In a review of the 1982 national Survey of Public Participation in the Arts, collected for the National Endowment of the Arts by the U.S. Census Bureau, Peterson and Sirkus (1992) examined arts participation in relation to occupational group (as a measure of social status). Their aim was to test the notion, as elaborated in Bourdieu (1984), that there is a direct correlation between high social status and the consumption of "high" cultural goods. To do this they considered the case of musical taste, examining items from the survey that addressed musical genre preferences, and attendance at types of music performances. They concluded that, in recent years, perhaps particularly in the U.S., the traditional highbrow/lowbrow division of musical taste has been transformed in favor of an omnivore-univore model. The latter model suggests that individuals with high occupational standing are omnivore-type music consumers: they attend and consume a variety of musical genres. Members of lower status occupational groups, by contrast, exhibit more restricted taste preferences (univores) and are also more likely to defend those preferences vehemently.

Quantitative modes of analysis have an important place within the sociology of music. Representative sampling techniques permit reliable and generalizable portraits of populations, which in turn permit the testing of hypotheses—in this case, concerning cultural consumption and social exclusion. But, as with all methods, quantitative techniques pose limits, even when practiced at their best. Peterson's and Sirkus's work (1992), for example, points directly to questions concerning music and the construction of self- and group-identity; most of these concern the social-psychological and cultural aspects of musical consumption and practice—music's

link, for example, with the social identities of its consumers, its role within sub- and small-group cultures, and its social uses within music-consuming worlds. And nowhere is this tradition better illustrated than in the pioneering work of Paul Willis (1978; see also Frith 1981), with its ethnographically oriented work on the sociology of popular music consumption.

Willis was concerned with how, in and through musical practice, through situated consumption of (and talk about) music, musical structures could be seen to have social-organizational properties and capacities. Methodologically, his study drew upon participant-observation techniques (see chapter 2, this volume). The great advantage of this kind of ethnographic observation is its ability to illuminate the non-discursive dimensions of action (such as emotions and embodiment)—the very dimensions overlooked by survey questionnaires and quasi-formal interview techniques (and also the dimensions of human existence most closely associated with music and musical response). Because of its aims, ethnography is conducted in real time and on the social territories germane to the research subjects themselves. If the aim of one's research is to understand how music functions, for example, how it inscribes social relations, or how it may serve to inculcate modes of agency within social settings (questions that hark back to Adorno's concerns), then the advantages of this approach more than outweigh its practical disadvantages (i.e., that it is labor and time intensive, focused on a particular milieu, and not conducive to generalization). In particular, ethnography's advantage lies in its holistic focus and the emphasis on the emergent and negotiated character of meaning within social settings (Hammerley and Atkinson 1995). Ethnography, in short, can illuminate music as it functions as a resource for meaning construction and for the structuring and organization of social settings.

Describing ethnographic work with two groups of music consumers, the "hippies" and the "bike boys," Willis made his theoretical and methodological perspective clear in the book's appendix, where he emphasized the virtues of participant observation and its ability to follow actors in natural environments and situations. When allied with other methods, he argued, it provided a means of understanding members' practices and meanings while suspending theoretical notions that might otherwise be externally imposed. His study involved "hanging around" with members of a motorbike club in an English city, engaging the men in group discussions (tape recorded) where records were played and discussed, and where conversation took off without prompting by the researcher; in the same way, Willis investigated the hippy scene by visiting three groups at their "pads" and holding similar discussion sessions with them. Through this unobtrusive mode of inquiry, held on the respondents' normal territory and following their ordinary conversation and action, Willis was able to observe how deeply music was implicated in the life worlds of his informants; compared to those of the hippies, the preferred songs of the bike boys were fast-paced and characterized by strong beats and pulsating rhythms. It is here that we can see the great advance of Willis's study, particularly in its handling of the "homology" concept. While Willis suggested that the preferred music of each group resonated with or was homologous to his groups' values and habits of being, his concern was to show how the boys themselves established these connections, how they themselves constructed the links between their preferred forms of music and social life. This point

bears underlining: the structural similarities between music and social organization documented in Willis's book were forged through the cultural practices and lay classifications of the group members. And it follows from this that, as Willis (1978: 193) put it, "objects, artifacts and institutions do not, as it were, have a single valency [one could read here also 'single social significance']. It is the act of social engagement with a cultural item which activates and brings out particular meanings."

In Willis's work, then, we can observe a theory of musical meaning as located in the interaction between musical objects and music's recipients; in this respect, Willis's work connects with other, more theoretically oriented, perspectives within music sociology that conceptualize musical meaning as the result of an interaction between music's properties (its mobilization of familiar or "stock" materials, conventions, styles, gestures) and the ways these properties are received and responded to (DeNora 1986; Martin 1995). While emphasizing the social construction of meaning, then, Willis is by no means dismissive of the ways in which music's specific properties may lend themselves with greater or lesser degrees of fit to particular interpretations and appropriations. In the theoretical appendix to his work (1978: 200–201), he describes how cultural items possess "objective possibilities," but suggests that

The same set of possibilities can encourage or hold different meanings in different ways. They can reflect certain preferred meanings and structures of attitude and feeling. On the other hand, because they relate to something material in the cultural item, something specific, unique and not given from the outside, the "objective possibilities" can also suggest new meanings, or certainly influence and develop given meanings in unexpected directions. This uncertain process is at the heart of the flux from which the generation of culture flows. The scope for the interpretation or influence of the "objective possibilities" of an item is not, however, infinite. They constitute a limiting as well as an enabling structure. It is also true that what has been made of these possibilities historically is a powerful and limiting influence on what is taken from them currently.

Willis's work demonstrates that if our aim is to understand music's social significance and dynamic relationship to social structure, we need to move beyond an exclusive concern with "the music itself" and investigate the processes of its reception and use. This line of thinking has been developed by sociologists of other cultural media: literature (Griswold 1986), television (Moore 1990), and theatre (Tota 1997). Across these studies, attention has been devoted to the more general fabrication of meaning and aesthetic response (including nonverbal response) through interaction with cultural texts, in ways that are directly linked to identity and world construction. The observation that agents attach connotations to things, and orient to things on the basis of perceived meanings, is a basic tenet of interpretivist sociology. But its implications for theorizing the nexus between aesthetic materials and society are profound. It signals a shift in focus from aesthetic objects and their content to the cultural practices in and through which aesthetic materials are appropriated and used to produce social life. And with this shift, we have moved from the cultural constructionism characteristic of recent trends in musicology (as described at the outset of this chapter) to the interactionist constructionism of sociology proper.

