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INTRODUCTION: BOURDIEU AND CULTURAL STUDIES

MANY IN THE academic world were saddened by the January 2002 death of French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu. We had already been at work for some time on this special issue, which we had originally envisioned as more narrowly focused on Bourdieu's reception in the USA. The news coverage of his death and the general reactions from our colleagues in the USA (ranging from a small number who were personally saddened to most who were largely indifferent) bore out our own general frustration that Bourdieu's significance in twentieth-century thought had not been well appreciated.

The essays here show how much Bourdieu was on the minds of a quite wide range of scholars in the USA, Canada, the UK, Australia, India and France. Whatever disagreements these contributors had with Bourdieu's theoretical formulations or empirical findings, they understood their research to be studies of social life *in dialogue with* Bourdieu's work, as opposed to the kind of discipline-guarding critique or hagiographic reiteration that has sometimes occupied the acolytes of other important scholars. From this distance, and mediated through his published works, we found Bourdieu's dislike of the US academic-as-rock-star approach to the dissemination of knowledge, coupled with his insistence on collaborative research to be much more compatible with our own views on research. We tried to work editorially in the spirit of collaboration rather than competition, and we found the authors extremely generous and collaborative in return. Unlike the usual experience of soliciting articles and then ranking and rejecting the 'losing' entries (though this, regrettably, was part of the process too), the authors here enthusiastically entrusted us with the task of making the journal work as a whole, instead of simply an awkward gathering of individual, capital-conveying single works.

However influential Bourdieu's work may have been, he has gone mainly under- or misread in the Anglophone academy. As Wacquant (1993) aptly described it, Bourdieu's poor reception in the USA resulted from basic incompatibilities between the cultural milieu from which his work emanated and the one in which it was implanted. From our perspective, teaching and using Bourdieu during the late 1980s to the present, this disconnect resulted from some

very specific developments within the US academy. Similar conditions, we have gathered through working on this special issue, may be present in other quarters of the Anglophone academy, and as Bourdieu's work on the French academy suggests, each instance must be investigated in its specificity, and other scholars have and will take on such analyses. We have long felt it a supreme irony that Bourdieu's analysis of the academy has made it possible for us to speculate now on the reasons why his work was so misread in the USA. This has to do with two asymmetries. On one hand, scholarship within the USA depends unduly on native scholarly output; foreign ideas are either ignored or marginalized. On the other, there is a crucial asymmetry in the training and methods between the humanities and social sciences as practiced in the USA; this creates myriad possibilities for particular ideas to agglutinate to existing class, culture and economic structures first within the academy and then, through various routes of diffusion, to society as a whole. Both of these factors shaped the reception of French 'theory' in the 1980s and 1990s. The US academy demonstrated a love for and then hostility toward French versions of structuralism (for there were also structuralisms in American linguistics and mathematics) and then toward French critiques of structuralism (both poststructural and postmodern). The complex cultural capital conveyed to those who had the ability to read the works (in French, especially, but at all), weighed in more substantially for those in the humanities than in the social sciences. For reasons that are still unfolding, the 1970–1990s love affair of literary studies and 'theory', coupled with an entrenched division in the USA between humanities and social sciences, transformed work that had been perhaps philosophical in its original impulses (and in a different academy) into something that had more to do with 'texts' than sociality. A sociologist, Bourdieu was perhaps the biggest victim of this decontextualization of thought. He was incorrectly lumped into 'post-structuralism', which veiled his very different critique of both structuralism and post-structuralism and left him on the side of those who were hostile to the French incursion. Unfortunately, this misplacement of his work made it nearly impossible to see the import of Bourdieu's intellectual contribution: he was in fact working from within the central currents of classical sociology held in common throughout any sociology department, but emphasizing practical reason, that is, the social genesis of logics of practice.

Paradoxically, for those arguing in favour of increased interdisciplinarity, Bourdieu offered a completely different model for extending the scope of scholastic interaction. Bourdieu's collaborative research practice united researchers with different training and different strengths, an effort much closer to American pragmatists John Dewey and Josiah Royce's understanding of empirical collectivism than to the understanding of research held by those who now practiced interdisciplinary 'theory'. Thus, in seeking radical new modes of scholarship, US scholars overlooked both the American tradition and the most important sustained intellectual outcome since the French 1968 student uprisings.

Cultural studies: Bourdieu lost and found

If we may be indulged in presenting our general sense of this peculiarly U.S. situation, it seems that the opaqueness, the loss of Bourdieu to the thinking of radical factions of the academy, resulted from an interaction between American campus politics and the retrenchment of departments in the face of disappearing disciplinary boundaries. In the 1970s and 1980s, when Bourdieu was publishing his major works on France and in French, American sociology and philosophy stood at nearly opposite poles in approaches to the study of human life worlds. Sociology had become dominated by demography and quantitative analysis (of course, some departments resisted this change) and philosophy became more analytic (with other forms of philosophy withering or defecting to nearby disciplines). Forgetting that, for example, both Weber and Durkheim published major philosophical works and that Wittgenstein, Russell and certainly J. L. Austin developed social theories within the context of ordinary language or purely mathematical representations of it, American sociology and philosophy turned a blind eye to one another and left a good portion of twentieth-century social thought to the dogs – that is, to mongrel trans-disciplines like cultural studies, or sub-departments of literature in which more ‘theory’ was read than ‘literature’.

‘Cultural studies’ – and there are national variants that emerged simultaneously and in dialogue – made tremendous sense as an intellectual space in which to calibrate non-disciplinary Continental thought to increasing discipline-bound universities in the USA and the UK. In the vast US university system, this resulted in confusion about what cultural studies actually meant (a lapse into discipline-thinking) and where it had come from. Always favouring the import over the indigenous, American cultural studies based in communications departments (and heavily indebted to James Carey’s work, itself heavily indebted to American pragmatism) was eclipsed by that which emerged concurrently in the UK (the Birmingham school). This happened, in part we believe, because of the status of communication departments relative to the conventional elite disciplines – English, history, and literature – as well as the capacity of the emergent ‘minority’ studies departments and programs to maintain semi-autonomous spaces through identity-claims and against disciplinary claims (which are always stronger, since they are more institutionally supported). Underlying this differential growth of cultural studies – in canonical and anti-canonical loci – was an intransigent difference in value between humanities and social sciences, between the ‘romantic’ single-author of the humanities research monograph and the collaborative, if perhaps, less artful multi-authored work in the social sciences. Cultural studies might have been both, but the structure of the American academy discouraged training and collaboration across this divide. Ironically, it is precisely this entrenched separation, and the social class and intellectual dispositions that define the two sides, which occupied a good deal of the postman’s son’s scholarly work.¹

As debates about disciplinarity heated up, the implicit division between humanities and social sciences actually grew more extreme because the modes for success – the ‘nomos’ or rules of competition – differed greatly and differed as expressions of the class system refracted within the US academy.

The problem of using cultural studies to create distance from disciplines was further aggravated by the uncertain position of the scholars who sought places within the emergent minority studies programmes, themselves an alternative to disciplinarity. Inheriting the ethnic identity model of identity politics, and living out their – our – marginality to the main thrusts of US knowledge production, the duality of radical US scholars posed enormous ethical problems. Whatever their social origins (but not despite them), US academics concerned with minority studies (whose safest home, during the Culture Wars, often seemed to be a place called ‘cultural studies’) were now in a different class, compelled by desires and systems of reward (i.e. by competition for forms of capital) that were not entirely synchronized with the ‘margins’ from which they had come but whom they still believed themselves to represent. Genuinely trying to reconstitute the US academy to be more egalitarian, inclusive and useful to the US people as a whole, progressive scholars were at the same time now struggling for pay equity, tenure and, though perhaps only secretly, a mention in the *New York Times Review of Books*.

The Balkanization of disciplines in the USA, with a largely humanities-based veneer of interdisciplinarity, and the ambiguity of identity politics left the emerging minority studies efforts haphazardly fighting local battles for existence. Once stabilized, they were founded on a unifying principle different from disciplines: the ‘object’ of study, itself. The transdisciplinary construction of this ‘object of study’ has been a central concern of Bourdieu’s work and is thus ideally suited to provide the conceptual, methodological and, perhaps most significant of all, ethical tools to deal with problems we face in trying to alter the terrain of the US academy.

Bourdieu’s import(ance) for cultural studies

The papers collected here cover a wide range of domains, which underscores the broad influence of Bourdieu’s work. Emerging in all the papers is: first, a theoretical and methodological interest in the notion of field and its associated attributes (habitus, capital and strategies) and second, an ethical concern over the role of intellectuals. These two axes of inquiry intersect at the crux of Bourdieu’s own concern, his seemingly contradictory insistence on both *autonomy* and *engagement*.

From the beginning of his career to his last interventions, Bourdieu argued for the importance of the notion of field. As a theoretical device it helped articulate the relationship between social structures and the impulse of individual

agents – an articulation between the objective and the subjective – that he hoped could help unify a revitalized and ethnically grounded discipline of sociology which had been a ‘division in fiefdoms’ (2001: 190). For Bourdieu (2000), the generic structure of field, defined ‘as a field of force and a field of struggle to transform these force relations’ (2000: 41) also helps construct the particulars of a social reality (e.g. the political) and provides a means of comparison with other fields (e.g. political vs. literary or religious) and helps us avoid undertaking false problems. But for our purpose, this notion of field is also instrumental in establishing the nexus of *autonomy* and *engagement*.

Indeed, a properly constituted field solely functions because the interests and stakes are implicitly shared by its members, while players outside the field remain unaffected. This self-interest inevitably leads to closure of the field, as observed in the field of the artistic avant-garde or that of mathematics. This condition provides the basis for autonomy, a situation where, at the limit, the field functions for its own sake, where, for instance, ‘a mathematician “kills” another mathematician by proving a theorem’, an action only understood in the field of mathematics and one that also benefits the field itself. From this model, Bourdieu argues that closure, autonomy, in effect isolates researchers in the ‘ivory tower’ that is the field; autonomy is the primary condition for the development of knowledge.

For Bourdieu, autonomy without engagement misses the point of human thought; the production of knowledge must be complemented by the diffusion of knowledge, a highly complex proposition in our heavily mediated world. Therein lies the role of engagement. Bourdieu has often argued that a closed field, while autonomous, runs the risk of sclerosis because changes in the field result from strategies derived from ‘unconscious relationship[s] between a habitus and a field’ (1993: 76). Without the effort to reveal these unconscious relationships, the field will promptly splinter into separate ‘specialties’, as sociology had in France, or it will be structured around formal dogmatic positions, which remain unchallenged, evidence of the hold that scholastic reason may take on a field. To avoid such a fate, Bourdieu argues that individuals/intellectuals engaged in a field must take a reflexive position to work out, in the psychoanalytic sense, the unconscious drive of habitus. Furthermore, he states that this concerted and collective reflexivity not only enhances the integrity of the field (or discipline), but also extends to an engagement in the world.

We use this resonance between field structure and intellectual responsibility, between autonomy and engagement, to sequence the papers presented below. We do so from the outside in and back out. First, the authors establish the figure of the engaged intellectual who plunges into her work in the autonomous confines of her field. Next, through specific and varied examples the authors examine the differentiating structure of those fields or the nature of their interaction with habitus. Finally, we resurge in a final reflection on the ambiguity, instability and dynamism of the intellectual.

Carol A. Stabile and Junya Morooka's article 'Between Two Evils, I Refuse to Choose the Lesser' leads us in that reflection by first reminding us of the contemporary conditions of the diffusion of knowledge which are overwhelmingly dominated by the media. To illustrate this situation, the authors paint a dismal picture of the unduly influential 'doxosophers', the uncritical ever present allies of dominant positions (presently, neo-liberals), who through their 'spectacular' actions and position inter-mediate specialized knowledge to a public. The media sanctioned authority bestowed upon these doxophers threatens the integrity – the autonomy – of the fields where knowledge is produced because the most fashionable rather than the most rigorous knowledge producers are favoured. Practitioners of a field become liable to two masters: the practices and norms of the discipline and the practices and norms of the market. The 'producers of knowledge' can counter this situation, by recognizing their responsibility in protecting the autonomy of their field and by more directly diffusing the knowledge they helped to discover. To detail this strategy, the authors chronicle Bourdieu's own path, from his defence of the Algerian against colonialism to his critique of globalization, to his active 'listening' as a researcher in the *Weight of the World*. In doing so the authors particularly insist on the stark difference between Bourdieu's attitude of *engagement* that they describe and the 'prophetic', 'omnipotent' and 'utopian' character of Sartre's actions. Rather than assuming freedom as a given, Bourdieu advises us to look within our own practice to identify sites of true freedom and build small-scale, modest practical morals that permit us to act with grounded optimism.

In his 'L'important c'est les lunettes', Dominique M. Richard underscores the existence of the social principle of vision and division that an intellectual has the responsibility to reveal and change through reflexivity. Richard details the reflexive strategies available to those specific intellectuals engaged in mathematical formulation – economists, statisticians, operations researchers, etc.

First, Richard demonstrates that despite claims to theoretical purity and detachment, the field of applied mathematics can easily and inconspicuously become the site of a radical scholastic perspective that promotes the symbolic violence which results from grounding so much of human rationality in the supposed 'fact' of mathematical analogy. Symbolic violence can be seen, for example, in policy debates that attempt to quantify elements like human suffering or in the blow to personal identity that those who are 'bad at maths' may experience.

Richard next examines the apparent paradox of Bourdieu's critique of quantitative methods and his concomitant use of complex statistical procedures. This analysis identifies Bourdieu's strategies, which deflect the potential symbolic violence of mathematical reasoning. Richard then uses Bourdieu's insights to outline the elements in the field of applied mathematics that need further scrutiny in order for practitioners to grapple with the unexpected moral dimensions of a discipline that appears so distant and esoteric.

In 'Bourdieu, Technique, and Technology', Jonathan Sterne continues this kind of disciplinary reassessment for the area of technology studies. His review of the field suggests that, at least in academic circles, the concept of technology has virtually collapsed into an empty marker for digital technologies and its applications. Technology analysts nevertheless try to appropriate a claim to newness for their field that relies on the marketability of 'high tech', which undermines the academic autonomy of the subfield. Indeed, Sterne notes that current technology research seems to be dictated by the 'value-system of advertisement'. Concerns generated within academic research – such as the social meaning and effects of 'online communities' – are quickly recuperated to market new products. This situation, he argues, demands a reconsideration of the idea of technology, a task that Bourdieu's reflexive sociology can aid.

Culling from some unexpected analyses by Bourdieu and collaborators, Sterne suggests that in order to stop considering technology as 'things', we should place technology in the context of habitus, with its emphasis on both practice and material possibility, its capacity to deal with history and group difference in 'preference' and use. Sterne provides a much-needed assessment of Bourdieu's relationship with Norbert Elias's concept of habits, alongside a review of the more familiar work of Marcel Mauss. This deepened reflection on habitus helps us understand what constitutes the object of technology. It thus enables Sterne to propose that we think of technical objects as the 'crystallization of social practices' and thus shift the study of technology to a study of the historico-social practices that induce their 'precipitation'. Foregoing a substantialized notion of technology may be a difficult step to take, but it opens to opportunities for a more engaged investment in technology itself.

Architectural theorist Helene Lipstadt's 'Can 'Art Professions' Be Bourdieuean Fields of Cultural Production? The Case of the Architecture Competition' continues the assessment of Bourdieu's utility for specific academic fields by comparing the structure of the field of architecture to more analysed fields of cultural production like literature and painting. She diagnoses a difference – the autonomy, which appears to elude architects because of their necessary relationship to clients and building trades – that has important implications for the study of autonomy of fields more generally. Although Bourdieu's notion of field has been widely recognized, the important dimension of autonomy has been less well understood. Lipstadt points out that studies of field may have overemphasized professional identity or professional position without recognizing, in at least the case of architects, those forces outside the 'profession' that help shape the very idea of what architects do. In the case of architecture, there are clearly market forces affecting what architects can produce. She is able to consider the 'field effect' that many of the non-architect actors induce in the field of architecture and takes as a case study the architectural competition, a practice that also exists in other art forms – the prize of Rome, for instance – but that is nonetheless more central to architects'

conviction that they are an 'art'. The competition creates a space for architects to become artists: to be autonomous and participate in the artistic *illusio* for which the highest interest is *dis-interestedness*. Lipstadt analyses the strategies, which seem to provide an increase in autonomy, but at a very high cost. Emphasizing the utility of Bourdieu's concept of *illusio* – participants in a field's investment in the values of the field, even if they are perpetual 'losers' – Lipstadt is able to explain why architects participate in competitions (even if they never win!) in order to sustain the system of values that make architecture closer to an art than a trade.

In 'Neoliberalism as Doxa: Bourdieu's Theory of the State and the Contemporary Indian Discourse on Globalization and Liberalization', Rohit Chopra focuses on Bourdieu's attacks on neo-liberalism and the attendant discourse of globalization. Interweaving examples from the India context, Chopra emphasizes Bourdieu's modification of the concept of *doxa* first in relation to *habitus*, then through a theory of the State as an embodiment of similar dispositions on a national scale, and finally as the illusive underpinning of transnational conceptual frameworks like neo-liberalism. Reviewing Bourdieu's late writings, one might ask how the belief that maximum economic growth, productivity and competitiveness are 'the ultimate and sole goal of human actions' has become seemingly uncontested and 'universal'.

Chopra shows how Bourdieu laid the groundwork to answer this question by introducing the notion of the State as a central agent in the social field operating in both an objective and subjective mode. In its objective mode, the State is the arbiter of the rate of exchange between the semi-autonomous forms of capital over which people struggle in the various fields that together comprise the social field. In its subjective mode, the State is an idea imprinted in each individual's perceptive schema that is largely organized by the media and structured by history and in the USA, especially by the history of democratic discourse. These two aspects are inextricably entangled and their relationship provides a dynamic unlike other theories of the State. Bourdieu argues for a more complex interaction – essentially, the dominant in any field will try to make it possible for the capital they have accumulated to have maximum value across other fields; hence, the ability to control the valuation rate improves the position of the dominant. Since there are several capitals in contention, the State is much less clearly in the hands of a single dominating group. However, the dominant group will devise strategies to maintain their dominance. Chopra shows how the current Indian political discourse has made neo-liberalism seem the natural 'next step' in India's economic development. He also shows how policies in Indian education that stemmed from colonialism have shifted to contemporary educational policies that favour globalization, a shift that underscores the role of the State on capital, *habitus*, and *doxa*.

Engler's 'Modern Times: Religion, Consecration and the State in Bourdieu' shows the vitality of Bourdieu within the field of religion. He traces Bourdieu's

relationship to Weber's discussions of modes of legitimation, adding another dimension to our understanding of the State. Engler begins by noting that while the interaction between habitus and field can explain the changes within a field, this interaction cannot account for the 'emergence or differentiation of fields' as these gain complexity over time. The author calls attention to the role of the State in consecrating the social order in modern times, a role that it had seized from religion in the Middle Ages. Although Bourdieu suggests that this shift in responsibility for consecration reflects a substitution of the religious hierarchy by the State hierarchy, which annihilates the former, Engler argues that religion continues to play an important role in our world. Specifically, if the State's consecration regulates the meta-field of power, the reach of this field does not extend to all agents, as it excludes the underprivileged and outcasts. At the margin of the fields over which the state exerts its calibrating force lie spaces where state consecration is ineffective and where religion may still operate by overseeing and validating a circulation of capital that passes through a soteriological economy that involves the eternity of the supernatural order. Engler shows that both the shift from gift to market economy and the diminution of religion as a mode of state legitimation were less complete and less dramatic than Bourdieu's undifferentiated-modern division suggests. Critiquing Bourdieu with Bourdieu's own framework, Engler provides an important corrective that makes it clearer how recent 'fundamentalisms' can take on the functions 'modern times' associate with the state.

Brigit Fowler reviews the specific characteristics of habitus in the context of gender relations through a critical reading of Bourdieu's *Masculine Domination*. She first notes that gender habitus is centrally focused on the body as it is manifested through unconscious gestures and attitudes, which have been passed through generations. Although this embodied gender distinction structures the relationship between genders in traditional Kabylia and contemporary France, the universality of such a dominance relation is put into question. However, Fowler echoes Bourdieu's position in suggesting that if shifts in these relations can happen, they will not be easy and will certainly not occur through cognitive means (e.g. consciousness-raising). With Bourdieu, she also agrees that beyond the personal good will to promote changes in gender relations, we must account for the symbolic institutionalization of gender differences in education or in the labour market and for the fragility of the alliances putatively designed to promote them. Fowler nonetheless suggests other avenues of change in the gender doxa that Bourdieu had not considered. For example, she reports that the eighteenth century witnessed the genesis of the public sphere in which women played a role as active intellectual participant. She notes that because of their exclusion from highbrow art and because of their superior cultural capital for middlebrow art, they were able to impact modernist literature by addressing social and political subjects, which, in effect, promoted habitus changes and shifts in gender division. Nonetheless, Fowler concludes with a cautionary statement, much

indebted to her cross reading of Bourdieu: the appearance of positive change in gender divisions may often hide increased symbolic violence in class divisions.

Carol Singley reminds us that one of the most fruitful moments of Bourdieu's influence in the USA occurred within literary studies. However, instead of 'applying' Bourdieu to literary texts, Singley treats Edith Wharton as a case study, much like Bourdieu's own treatment of Flaubert. Instead of simply applying some of Bourdieu's concepts to 'read' a novel, Singley intensively analyses the sense of constraint and limited ability to see other life possibilities in the central characters of Wharton's novels. Her Wharton is a sociologist of cultural reproduction, as astute in her identification of class fractional differences as she is adept at conveying the genteel brutality of the symbolic violence carried in the slight, in the derisive comment, in the very acting of effecting modernness through manner and garb. For Singley, Wharton has identified the basic space of social class reproduction, deftly handling issues like historical shifts in cultural values that in turn change the valuation of cultural and social capital, ideas that Bourdieu later amplifies and details through his conceptualization of habitus. Like Bourdieu, Wharton recognizes the importance of history in the space of habitus. She thus uses a generational schema to structure her novels and thereby highlights the changes that educational, social, and cultural capital force in symbolic capital. As Singley notes, Wharton also foregrounds the strategies that social agents like Archer deploy when their habitus interacts with the doxa of a particular field and is deflected.

If Singley's piece only suggests the possibility of habitus change through strategies, Greg Noble and Megan Watkins explicitly critique this point in 'So, How did Bourdieu Learn to Play Tennis? Habitus, Consciousness and Habituation'. While embracing Bourdieu's concept of habitus, they nevertheless outline the various critiques of it as deterministic. Noble and Watkins fault the eclipsing of consciousness, a trait they believe originated from 'Bourdieu's ambiguous relation with Spinozan monism'. They observe that, if Spinoza stresses the importance of the body in the development of dispositions, his conception of body-mind relation also includes the possibility for subjective reflection, a characteristic they view as lacking at least in Bourdieu's writing on habitus. How, they ask, is it possible, essentially, for an agent to acquire skills not present in their habitus? How did the postman's son learn to play tennis?

Recognizing Bourdieu's significance in the sociology of sports, and taking him at his word when he has used a game metaphor, the authors analyse the process of training for a game, an activity that requires a conscious effort and interplay between various levels of awareness. They identify situations where conscious decisions take place in an internal soliloquy or in the inter-subjective relation with coaches and other support staff. These conscious decisions control the process of habituation, which over time becomes an unconscious embodied practice. They believe it is such a process that governs the instillation of Bourdieu's habitus.

Tony Shirato and Jen Webb – in ‘Bourdieu’s Concept of Reflexivity as Metaliteracy’ – also reassess the critique that Bourdieu’s notion of habitus cannot account for, or does not allow for agentive change. Reviewing in particular the most important, and perhaps most cited, critique of Bourdieu – that undertaken in Michel deCerteau’s *The Practice of Everyday Life* – Shirato and Webb turn to the work Bourdieu produces after that critique, particularly his late work on reflexivity. Especially interested in ordinary consumption and communication, they foreground the collective aspect of habitus that results from the interpenetration of ‘subject’ with field (‘the field *is* the subject’) and re-introduce the possibility for reflexive positions afforded by any agent in any field that Bourdieu suggested. Reflexivity – as exemplified in the work compiled in the *Weight of the World* – would thus in itself be the motor for social change. Far from privileging academic sites of reflexivity (for example, Bourdieu’s sociology), reflexive knowledge is, Shirato and Webb argue, a product of the same features of habitus that delimit thought in the first place. Nevertheless, under present conditions, the tendency to reassess the propositions that make a habitus possible is a property mainly of academic fields. It is important to recall, however, that such reflexivity is a collective activity, not, as has perhaps been the model for the social radical, the product of individual critique. Thus, the reason that Bourdieu’s work seems restrictive is because those who critique him are looking for the capacity for individual agentive activity rather than the forms of collective critique that occur now mainly within autonomous fields.

As the authors above have shown, Bourdieu’s work, while developed within sociology, ranges across many ‘disciplines’. Far from constituting a ‘final word’, Bourdieu wanted his work to be reworked, but rigorously and empirically, not as a kind of fad. Andrew John Miller’s essay ‘Pierre Bourdieu and the Perils of *Allodoxia*: Nationalism, Globalism, and the Geopolitics of Intellectual Exchange’ foregrounds how difficult this process has been given the ongoing differences between national-academic fields. Closely examining a single – and for some readers, apparently cranky – essay, Bourdieu’s ‘Passport to Duke’, Miller analyses the entanglement of the intellectual enterprise with the State, resulting in tremendous obstacles to intellectual exchange. This ‘letter’, written as his proxy to a conference appearance, seems on first reading to unnecessarily create a rift between French intellectuals and the American academia. In fact, Miller notes that in his introduction to the essay, Richard Shusterman suggests that Bourdieu’s refusal to participate in the Duke conference resulted from a disdain for US literary and cultural theory, and perhaps a lack of understanding of the gender theory then being produced at Duke (and slated for presentation at the conference). Yet, Miller reminds us that Bourdieu’s American introduction to *Distinction* clearly encouraged the exportation of his sociological concepts in a US context and that he visited Berkeley after the ‘passport’s’ writing. Bourdieu, in effect, warns us that the uprooting of any intellectual from the social ‘constellation’ that contributes to her disposition and position taking may easily lead to misreading.

Moreover, he cautions that the uncritical imposition of concepts to new environments fails to acknowledge the State's contribution to the formulation of the problems being considered. Echoing Stabile and Morooka's concerns about media's influence on intellectuals, Miller suggests that academic diplomacy can also confer undue authority on scholars that can significantly distort the currency in the field in which they intervene. By refusing the mediatic image that Duke's invitation implicitly conferred on him, Bourdieu's concern, indeed, may have been one of integrity. In this context, it is important to recall that Bourdieu has always encouraged militant exchange between intellectuals of different countries. At the same time, he has warned that their commonality has to primarily stem from their specific reflexive stance *vis-à-vis* their respective States and their awareness of the hegemonic position their nationality alone may award them.

On the occasion of Bourdieu's death, long-time collaborator Wacquant said it would take 50 years to complete the work Bourdieu had started. Many disciplines and many national academies will be part of this endeavour. It is our hope, as was our experience working with the diverse authors represented in this volume, that such work not result in hagiography or disputes about who has the 'correct' interpretation, but rather engenders cross-thinking, ethical reflection and good-humoured collective work. We will continue to ponder what seemed like a paradox in Bourdieu's position – against rampant interdisciplinarity – and his work – that of creative and compassionate collaboration – and find in his life as scientist and as an activist, fruitful routes to *autonomy* and *engagement*.

Note

- 1 See especially the terse early collaborative essays, *Academic Discourse*, developed more comprehensively and theoretically in the later *The State Nobility*, which demonstrate the deeply held understanding of the differences and different ways of evaluating the kinds of intelligence that lead one to a career in philosophy or literature vs. economics or geography: the precise attributes endowed by high cultural capital are the values used to select students for the former – 'creativity' – while those associated with the middle and lower classes – 'thoroughness' and dogged attention to detail – land students in the latter. Both those selecting and those selected agree to the criterion, and the students value their respective capacities, demonstrating the underlying mode through which the school system in France reproduces the class system.

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